T-538/24

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) 8 July 2026 (*) ( State aid – Italian air transport market – Extension and amendment of a compensation scheme for airlines with an Italian operating licence – Decision not to raise any objections – Aid intended to make good the damage caused by an exceptional occurrence – Article 107(2)(b) TFEU – Eligibility condition relating to a minimum remuneration requirement for employees whose home base is located in Italy – Principle of non-discrimination – Free provision of services – Freedom of establishment – Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 – Assessment of damage – Causal link – Obligation to state reasons ) In Case T‑538/24, Ryanair DAC, established in Swords (Ireland), represented by F.-C. Laprévote, E. Vahida, S. Rating, C. Cozzani and T. Capelli, lawyers, applicant, v European Commission, represented by J. Carpi Badía and C. Faroghi, acting as Agents, defendant, supported by Neos SpA, established in Somma Lombardo (Italy), represented by M. Merola, lawyer, and by Air Dolomiti SpA – Linee Aeree Regionali Europee, established in Villafranca di Verona (Italy), represented by E. Spinelli, G. Zampa and G. Candeloro, lawyers, interveners, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber), composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk (Rapporteur), President, H. Cassagnabère and T. Pavelin, Judges, Registrar: S. Spyropoulos, Administrator, having regard to the written part of the procedure, further to the hearing on 22 January 2026, gives the following Judgment 1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Ryanair DAC, seeks the annulment of Commission Decision C(2024) 2339 final of 15 April 2024 on State aid SA.109677 (2023/N) – Italy – COVID-19: Amendment of the compensation scheme for airlines with an EU operating licence delivered by Italy (‘the contested decision’). Background to the dispute 2        By decreto-legge n. 34 – Misure urgenti in materia di salute, sostegno al lavoro e all’economia, nonché’ di politiche sociali connesse all’emergenza epidemiologica da COVID-19 (Decree-Law No 34 on urgent health, labour support, economy and social-policy measures related to the COVID-19 epidemiological emergency) of 19 May 2020 (Ordinary Supplement to GURI No 128 of 19 May 2020, p. 1), as amended and converted into law by Law No 77 of 17 July 2020 (Ordinary Supplement to GURI No 180 of 18 July 2020, p. 1), the Italian authorities established, inter alia, a fund of EUR 130 million for compensation of the damage suffered by the air transport sector in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. 3        On 15 October 2020, in accordance with Article 108(3) TFEU, the Italian Republic notified the European Commission of an aid scheme consisting in subsidies paid out of the fund created by Decree-Law No 34 (‘the scheme at issue’). That scheme, the legal basis of which was Article 198 of Decree-Law No 34, was intended to make good the damage suffered by airlines eligible for compensation in the period from 1 March to 15 June 2020 as a result of the travel restrictions and other containment measures taken to limit the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. 4        The conditions of eligibility for the scheme at issue, as set out in Article 198 of Decree-Law No 34, are as follows. First, the airline must not be the beneficiary of a fund created by another decree-law providing for compensation for damage caused by the COVID‑19 pandemic for airlines holding a licence issued by the Italian authorities and entrusted with the performance of public service obligations on the date of entry into force of that decree-law. Second, the airline must hold a valid air operator’s certificate and an Italian licence. Third, the capacity of the airline’s aircraft must be greater than 19 places. Fourth, the airline must apply to its employees whose home base is located in Italy and to employees of third-party undertakings taking part in its activity remuneration which may not be lower than the minimum remuneration established by the national collective agreement applicable to the air transport sector, as concluded by the employers’ organisations and trade unions considered to be the most representative at national level (‘the minimum remuneration requirement’). 5        On 22 December 2020, the Commission, by Decision C(2020) 9625 final on State aid SA.59029 (2020/N) – Italy – COVID-19: Compensation scheme for airlines with an Italian operating licence (‘the initial decision’), decided not to raise objections to the scheme at issue on the ground that that scheme, including the eligibility conditions, was compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(2)(b) TFEU. The Commission stated in that decision that the Italian authorities had identified three airlines that met the eligibility conditions for the scheme at issue, namely Blue Panorama Airlines SpA (‘Blue Panorama’) and the interveners, Air Dolomiti SpA – Linee Aeree Regionali Europee (‘Air Dolomiti’) and Neos SpA. 6        On 9 August 2021, by Commission Decision C(2021) 6040 final on State aid SA.62152 (2021/N) – Italy – COVID-19: Amendment of the compensation scheme for airlines with an EU operating licence delivered by Italy, the Commission decided not to any raise objections to the extension and amendment of the scheme at issue to make good the damage suffered by eligible airlines in the period from 16 June to 31 December 2020. 7        In the judgment of 24 May 2023, Ryanair v Commission (Italy; aid scheme; COVID-19) (T‑268/21, EU:T:2023:279), the General Court, in accordance with the applicant’s claim, annulled the initial decision. The General Court found, in essence, that the contested decision was vitiated by an insufficient statement of reasons concerning the analysis of one of the conditions for eligibility for the scheme at issue, namely the one relating to the minimum remuneration requirement. In order to address the failure to state reasons identified in that judgment, the Commission, on 26 March 2024, adopted Decision C(2024) 1777 final on State aid SA.59029 (2020/N) – Italy – COVID-19: Compensation scheme for airlines with an Italian operating licence (‘the amended initial decision’), approving the scheme at issue. 8        On 13 October 2023, in accordance with Article 108(3) TFEU, the Italian Republic notified the Commission of the extension and amendment of the scheme at issue to make good the damage suffered by eligible airlines for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2021 as a result of travel restrictions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic (‘the amended scheme at issue’). More specifically, the amended scheme at issue was intended to compensate for the damage suffered during that period on certain routes to or from Italy or within that country (‘the routes concerned’) which had been affected by one or more travel restrictions or other containment measures involving a flight ban, a ban on the entry of passengers or on non-essential travel, the closure of an airport or a local or national containment measure (‘the travel restrictions at issue’). While maintaining the conditions for eligibility for the scheme at issue, described in paragraph 4 above, the amendment of that scheme notified increased the latter’s budget by EUR 100 million and altered the parameters for calculating the aid to be granted under that scheme. 9        By the contested decision, the Commission decided not to raise any objections with respect to the amended scheme at issue, finding that it was compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(2)(b) TFEU. Forms of order sought 10      The applicant claims that the Court should: –        annul the contested decision; –        order the Commission to pay the costs; –        order the interveners to bear their own costs. 11      The Commission and the interveners contend that the General Court should: –        dismiss the action; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. Law 12      Before examining the applicant’s pleas, it should be observed that, although the Commission does not dispute the admissibility of the action in so far as it seeks to safeguard the applicant’s procedural rights, the Commission does not acknowledge that the applicant has standing to challenge the contested decision on the merits. 13      In that regard, it should be recalled that the Courts of the European Union are entitled to assess, according to the circumstances of each case, whether the proper administration of justice justifies the dismissal of the action on its merits without first ruling on its admissibility (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 February 2002, Council v Boehringer, C‑23/00 P, EU:C:2002:118, paragraphs 51 and 52, and of 14 September 2016, Trajektna luka Split v Commission, T‑57/15, not published, EU:T:2016:470, paragraph 84). In the present case, since the action is in any event unfounded, for the reasons set out below, and since an assessment of the admissibility of the action involves a complex analysis, it is appropriate, in the interests of procedural economy, to examine at the outset the pleas raised by the applicant, without first ruling on the admissibility of the action, and in particular on the applicant’s standing to bring proceedings. 14      The applicant relies on five pleas in law in support of the action, alleging, first, infringement of the principles of the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment; second, infringement of Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ 2008 L 177, p. 6; ‘the Rome I Regulation’); third, infringement of Article 107(2)(b) TFEU; fourth, infringement of its procedural rights; and, fifth, failure to state reasons. First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of the free provision of services and the freedom of establishment 15      The applicant submits that one of the conditions for eligibility for the scheme at issue, the minimum remuneration requirement (see paragraph 4 above), infringes the principle of the freedom to provide services laid down in Article 56 TFEU and Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (OJ 2008 L 293, p. 3), as well as the principle of the freedom of establishment laid down in Article 49 TFEU, and that the Commission’s assessment in that regard in the amended initial decision, to which the contested decision refers, is insufficient and incorrect. 16      In the first place, the applicant claims that the minimum remuneration requirement infringes Article 56 TFEU. That type of measure involves additional expenses for operators and, according to the case-law, is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of services. The applicant observes that the principles arising from the case-law relating to that provision are applicable in the present case. 17      In the second place, the applicant argues that the Commission failed to examine the appropriateness, necessity and proportionality of the minimum remuneration requirement, even though such an assessment is mandatory given the fact that that requirement is liable to infringe Article 15(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008. Merely referring in the amended initial decision to recital 9 of Regulation No 1008/2008 and to the Report COM(2019) 120 final from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 1 March 2019, entitled ‘Aviation Strategy for Europe: Maintaining and promoting high social standards’, does not constitute a sufficient examination in that regard. 18      More specifically, the applicant claims that the Commission did not carry out an analysis of the proportionality of the restriction at issue. First, the minimum remuneration requirement is not appropriate for ensuring the protection of workers in the light of Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (OJ 1997 L 18, p. 1). As the applicant stated before the adoption of the initial decision, that requirement is foreseen in a collective agreement entered into by employers’ organisations and trade unions which are not sufficiently representative of employees in the sector at issue. Second, the Commission failed to demonstrate that the minimum remuneration requirement was justified by the cost of living in the Member State where the services are performed. Third, the Commission did not examine the proportionality of that requirement by comparing the overall conditions enjoyed by the workers of operators from other Member States. 19      In the third place, the applicant argues that those errors also vitiate the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of the minimum remuneration requirement with the principle of the freedom of establishment. 20      The Commission, supported by the interveners, contests the arguments put forward by the applicant. 21      In that regard, it should be observed as a preliminary point that the first paragraph of Article 56 TFEU provides that ‘restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended’. 22      Article 58(1) TFEU states that ‘freedom to provide services in the field of transport shall be governed by the provisions of the Title relating to transport’. 23      As is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice, the very purpose of Regulation No 1008/2008 is to define the conditions for applying in the air transport sector the principle of the freedom to provide services (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 February 2003, Stylianakis, C‑92/01, EU:C:2003:72, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited). Article 15(1) of that regulation provides that ‘Community air carriers shall be entitled to operate intra-Community air services’. 24      The first paragraph of Article 49 TFEU provides that ‘restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited’. 25      In accordance with the case-law, the freedom to provide services precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State, irrespective of whether there is discrimination on the grounds of nationality or residence (see judgment of 6 February 2003, Stylianakis, C‑92/01, EU:C:2003:72, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). 26      It is also consistent case-law that the freedom to provide services requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality against providers of services who are established in another Member State, but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where it lawfully provides similar services (see judgment of 11 December 2019, TV Play Baltic, C‑87/19, EU:C:2019:1063, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 27      The application of the host Member State’s domestic legislation to service providers is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of services by persons or undertakings established in other Member States when it involves expenses and additional administrative and economic burdens (see judgment of 24 January 2002, Portugaia Construções, C‑164/99, EU:C:2002:40, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). 28      A restriction on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services may be justified where it serves overriding requirements relating to the public interest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see judgment of 28 April 2009, Commission v Italy, C‑518/06, EU:C:2009:270, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 23 November 1999, Arblade and Others, C‑369/96 and C‑376/96, EU:C:1999:575, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 29      In the present case, the Commission observed, in recitals 18 and 72 of the contested decision, that the eligibility conditions for the scheme at issue were unchanged, namely as described in recital 27 of the initial decision. As regards the minimum remuneration requirement, the Commission stated in recital 27(d) of the initial decision that, in order to benefit from the scheme at issue, an airline had to apply to its employees, as well as to employees of third-party undertakings involved in its activities, whose home base, within the meaning of Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2012 L 296, p. 1), is located in Italy, remuneration which could not be lower than the minimum established by the national collective agreement for the aviation sector, entered into by the employers’ organisations and trade unions that were considered to be the most representative at national level. 30      In recital 72 of the contested decision, set out in section 4.3.4 thereof, entitled ‘Compliance with other provisions of EU law’, the Commission found that since the amended scheme at issue maintained the minimum remuneration requirement as an eligibility condition, as foreseen in the scheme at issue, the finding set out in section 3.3.4 of the amended initial decision on the compliance of that requirement remained unchanged. 31      In recitals 98 to 105 of the amended initial decision, which are in section 3.3.4 thereof, the Commission considered that there was particular reason that justified an examination of whether the minimum remuneration requirement could infringe provisions of EU law other than Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. According to the Commission, that examination was justified by the fact that the minimum remuneration requirement was not inherent in the objective of the scheme at issue and that the Italian Low Fares Airline Association (AICALF) had lodged a complaint concerning Article 203 of Decree-Law No 34. That latter provision imposed a minimum remuneration obligation on carriers operating on Italian territory that was comparable to the minimum remuneration requirement. After observing that the latter requirement limited the freedom for the beneficiaries of the scheme at issue and their employees to choose the rules applicable to their employment contracts as concerns remuneration, and that it was therefore necessary to assess the compatibility of that requirement with the Rome I Regulation, the Commission stated that, for the sake of completeness, it would also assess the compatibility of that requirement with the principle of the freedom to provide services. 32      In that assessment, in recitals 111 to 119 of the amended initial decision, set out in section 3.3.4.2 thereof, the Commission concluded that the minimum remuneration requirement appeared to comply with Article 15 of Regulation No 1008/2008 and, therefore, did not infringe the principle of the freedom to provide services. In that regard, it observed that the principle of the freedom to provide services in the air transport sector was not governed by Article 56 TFEU, but by Regulation No 1008/2008 and, more specifically, Article 15(1) thereof. The Commission also stated that, under recital 9 of that regulation, the principle of the freedom to provide services in the air transport sector was subject to compliance with national legislation protecting workers, which varied across the Member States, as was observed in the Commission report COM(2019) 120 final, referred to in paragraph 17 above. Consequently, according to the Commission, the fact that certain Member States applied stricter rules than others, as could be the case with the minimum remuneration requirement imposed in Italy, could not constitute an infringement of the principle of the freedom to provide services in the air transport sector. 33      As a preliminary point, it is necessary to reject the interveners’ argument that the minimum remuneration requirement was an element that was indissolubly linked to the object of the scheme at issue, such that the Commission was not required to assess it separately and that its effect on the compatibility of the aid considered as a whole had to be determined exclusively in the light of Article 107(2) TFEU. The Commission explained in recital 101 of the amended initial decision that the objective of the scheme at issue was to make good the damage suffered by the beneficiaries of that scheme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, whereas the minimum remuneration requirement aimed at ensuring that those beneficiaries met salary obligations concerning their employees with a home base in Italy. Moreover, it is not apparent from the file, nor have the interveners established, that the imposition of a minimum remuneration for workers whose home base is situated in Italy is inherent in the objective of making good the abovementioned damage suffered by certain airlines. Consequently, contrary to what is claimed by the interveners, the Commission was entitled to consider that it was necessary to examine the compatibility of that requirement with provisions of EU law other than Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. 34      Next, as regards the applicant’s arguments, it must be observed that it disputes the Commission’s assessment in the amended initial decision, to which the contested decision refers, observing, in essence, that the minimum remuneration requirement restricts the principle of the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment and that the Commission failed to fulfil its obligation to examine whether that requirement was justified. 35      In that regard, in the first place, it should be stated that the applicant has failed to explain how the minimum remuneration requirement would have the effect of making the provision of air transport services ‘between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State’ or how it would be ‘liable to prohibit, impede or render less advantageous the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State’ for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraphs 25 and 26 above, such that that requirement could restrict the exercise of the freedom to provide services. 36      It is true that by imposing minimum remuneration conditions on all workers in the air transport sector whose home base is in Italy, that requirement, which is also laid down in Article 203 of Decree-Law No 34 (see paragraph 31 above), also obliges airlines established outside Italy to meet a minimum remuneration requirement for their staff whose home base is in Italy, in the same way as airlines based in Italy. However, those foreign airlines remain free to apply other wage conditions, potentially less favourable, to their employees whose home base is not located in Italy, even though those employees might be required to work occasionally or for short periods in Italy. 37      In the application, the applicant cites the judgment of 15 March 2001, Mazzoleni and ISA (C‑165/98, EU:C:2001:162, paragraph 24), in asserting that the minimum remuneration requirement ‘involves expenses and additional administrative and economic burdens’. However, it must be stated that the applicant does not explain how that requirement would, in practice, create an additional burden for foreign airlines with employees whose home base is in Italy or how it would deter those airlines from providing cross-border services to and from Italy. 38      In the second place, although the applicant cites in its written pleadings examples drawn from the case-law of situations in which minimum remuneration measures could constitute restrictions on the freedom to provide services, it must be stated, as the Commission has done, that those examples concerned situations which cannot be transposed to the present case. 39      The cases cited by the applicant involved different forms of remuneration measures imposed by the authorities of a Member State relating either to employees working in another Member State, as is the case in the judgment of 18 September 2014, Bundesdruckerei (C‑549/13, EU:C:2014:2235), or to posted workers, namely workers who, for a limited time, perform their work in a Member State other than that in which they normally work, as is the case in the judgments of 15 March 2001, Mazzoleni and ISA (C‑165/98, EU:C:2001:162); of 18 December 2007; Laval un Partneri (C‑341/05, EU:C:2007:809); and of 3 April 2008, Rüffert (C‑346/06, EU:C:2008:189). In contrast to those cases, the minimum remuneration requirement in the present case applies only to workers with a home base in the Member State concerned here, namely Italy. Accordingly, the concept of ‘home base’ within the meaning of Regulation No 965/2012, as amended by Annex II to Commission Regulation (EU) No 83/2014 of 29 January 2014 (OJ 2014 L 28, p. 17), expressly referred to in the minimum remuneration requirement, refers to ‘the location, assigned by the operator to the crew member, from where the crew member normally starts and ends a duty period or a series of duty periods and where, under normal circumstances, the operator is not responsible for the accommodation of the crew member concerned’. Consequently, the minimum remuneration requirement does not target posted workers who work in Italy for short periods of time or occasionally and who usually work in another Member State. 40      In the third place, it should be observed that Directive 96/71, relied on by the applicant (see paragraph 18 above), despite the minimum remuneration requirement not concerning posted workers, states explicitly in Article 3(1) thereof that Member States must apply minimum wage conditions provided for by law or collective agreements classified as universally applicable, to workers posted to their territory, whatever the law applicable to the employment relationship of those workers. Such a provision is, moreover, consistent with the case-law according to which EU law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour agreements relating to minimum wages entered into by both sides of industry, to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, regardless of the country in which the employer is established (see judgment of 23 November 1999, Arblade and Others, C‑369/96 and C‑376/96, EU:C:1999:575, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). 41      It follows from the foregoing that the application of national minimum remuneration measures to posted workers respecting the conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71 is required by that directive and therefore complies in principle with the freedom to provide services. Consequently, the applicant has no valid grounds to challenge the compatibility with the freedom to provide services of such a measure, as laid down by the legislation of a Member State, and relating to workers whose home base is located in the Member State in question, as is exactly the case with the minimum remuneration requirement. 42      In the fourth place, Regulation No 1008/2008, which determines the conditions for applying the principle of the freedom to provide services in the air transport sector (see paragraph 23 above), provides that Member States are to apply their social legislation to service providers which are active on their territory, regardless of the Member State of origin of the undertaking concerned. Indeed, recital 9 of that regulation, cited by the Commission in recital 114 of the amended initial decision, states that ‘with respect to employees of a Community air carrier operating air services from an operational base outside the territory of the Member State where that Community air carrier has its principal place of business, Member States should ensure the proper application of Community and national social legislation’. The minimum remuneration requirement is very much a measure of Italian social legislation aimed at protecting workers, to which the freedom to provide cross-border air transport services is subject. 43      It follows from the foregoing that the Commission was not required to carry out an in-depth assessment of the justification for the minimum remuneration requirement, contrary to what is claimed by the applicant. Such a finding is also consistent with the judgment of 23 January 2025, Neos v Ryanair and Commission (C‑490/23 P, EU:C:2025:32), in which the Court of Justice set aside, on appeal, the judgment of 24 May 2023, Ryanair v Commission (Italy; aid scheme; COVID-19) (T‑268/21, EU:T:2023:279). Indeed, in paragraph 58 of that judgment, concerning the absence of reasoning in the initial decision in relation to compliance of the requirement at issue with the freedom to provide services, the Court of Justice stated that ‘the Commission’s obligation to state reasons does not in any event mean that it must in every case justify the absence of an explicit examination of the compatibility of an aid measure in the light of certain provisions or certain principles of EU law other than the State aid rules and, therefore, give its view on their relevance for the purpose of such an examination’. The Court of Justice therefore considered that it was not necessary to carry out, in the initial decision, an explicit examination of the compatibility of the minimum remuneration requirement with the principle of the freedom to provide services. Nor, is it possible, therefore, to require an examination by the Commission of the justification for that requirement in the light of that latter principle in the contested decision, or in the amended initial decision to which it refers. 44      Lastly, since the applicant’s line of argument relating to the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of the minimum remuneration requirement with the principle of the freedom to provide services has been rejected, its arguments relating to free establishment must also be rejected. Indeed, the applicant’s arguments in that respect do not contain any specific points in addition to those relating to the freedom to provide services. 45      Having regard to the foregoing, the present plea must be dismissed. Second plea, alleging infringement of Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation 46      The applicant submits that the Commission infringed Article 8(1), (2) and (4) of the Rome I Regulation in its assessment of the minimum remuneration requirement in the amended initial decision, to which the contested decision refers. 47      In that regard, the applicant submits that the Commission erred in considering that the concept of ‘home base’ constituted a significant indicium for the purpose of determining the ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ for the purposes of the Rome I Regulation, thus misinterpreting the judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira and Others (C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, EU:C:2017:688). 48      According to the applicant, that equating of the concept of ‘home base’ with that of ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ led the Commission to conclude, in recital 109 of the amended initial decision, that all carriers with employees based in Italy had to meet the social protection afforded under Italian law, no matter the nationality of those carriers or the law applicable to the employment contract. By that finding, the Commission failed to take account of the particular circumstances of each worker. That finding also means that the parties to an employment contract are not free to choose the law applicable to the contract, in breach of Article 8(1) of the Rome I Regulation, and that employees are deprived of the protection afforded by Article 8(2) and Article 8(4) thereof. 49      The Commission, supported by the interveners, contests the arguments put forward by the applicant. 50      In that regard, it should be observed that Article 8(1) of the Rome I Regulation provides as follows: ‘An individual employment contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 3. Such a choice of law may not, however, have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.’ 51      Article 8(2) of the Rome I Regulation provides inter alia that, ‘to the extent that the law applicable to the individual employment contract has not been chosen by the parties, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract’. 52      Article 8(3) of the Rome I Regulation states that, ‘where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraph 2, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated’. 53      Lastly, Article 8(4) of the Rome I Regulation provides that ‘where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 2 or 3, the law of that other country shall apply’. 54      In the present case, the Commission considered in recital 72 of the contested decision, set out in section 4.3.4 thereof, entitled ‘Compliance with other provisions of Union law’, that since the amended scheme at issue retained the minimum remuneration requirement as an eligibility condition, as foreseen in the scheme at issue, its finding in section 3.3.4 of the amended initial decision remained unchanged. 55      In recitals 106 to 110 of the amended initial decision, set out in section 3.3.4.1 thereof, the Commission found that the minimum remuneration requirement appeared to comply with Article 8(1) of the Rome I Regulation. 56      In that regard, the Commission observed that the minimum remuneration requirement applied only to employees who had their home base in Italy and that the Court of Justice had stated in the judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira and Others (C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, EU:C:2017:688), that the concept of ‘home base’ for an aircraft crew was a significant indicium for determining ‘the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract’ within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the Rome I Regulation. The Commission observed that, under Article 8(1) of that regulation, such employees could not be deprived of the protection afforded by Italian law, which included the minimum remuneration requirement, with the result that all airlines had, in any event, to comply with that requirement with regard to their employees with a home base in Italy, no matter the Member State of origin of those airlines. 57      In essence, the applicant complains that the Commission erred in finding that the concept of an airline employee’s ‘home base’, to which the minimum remuneration requirement refers, was equivalent to that of ‘the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract’ as laid down in Article 8(2) of the Rome I Regulation. According to the applicant, equating those concepts led to an infringement of Article 8(1), (2) and (4) of that regulation. 58      In that regard, as a preliminary point, it is necessary to reject the interveners’ argument made at the hearing that the minimum remuneration requirement was an element that was indissolubly linked to the object of the scheme at issue. Without it being necessary to rule on its admissibility, contested at the hearing by the applicant, that argument must be rejected for the reasons set out in paragraph 33 above. It must therefore be held, contrary to what is claimed by the interveners, that the Commission was required to assess separately whether or not that requirement infringed EU law, in particular as regards its compatibility with the Rome I Regulation. 59      As regards the analysis of the compliance of the minimum remuneration requirement with Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation, it should be observed that, according to paragraph 69 of the judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira and Others (C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, EU:C:2017:688), the concept of ‘home base’, defined in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 of 16 December 1991 on the harmonisation of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation (OJ 1991 L 373, p. 4), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1899/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 (OJ 2006 L 377, p. 1), is a significant indicium for determining the ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ within the meaning of Article 19(2)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1; ‘the Brussels I Regulation’), in force at the time. According to paragraph 73 of the judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira and Others (C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, EU:C:2017:688), it is only in specific cases where factual circumstances demonstrate a closer connection with another Member State that the home base could be less relevant to the determination of the ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’ within the meaning of the Brussels I Regulation. 60      The concept of ‘place where the employee habitually carries out his work’, as used in the Brussels I Regulation and reviewed by the Court in the judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira and Others (C‑168/16 and C‑169/16, EU:C:2017:688), has wording which is very similar to that of the concept of ‘country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract’, laid down in Article 8(2) of the Rome I Regulation, and those two concepts must be interpreted consistently, in accordance, in particular, with recital 7 of the Rome I Regulation, which provides that its substantive scope and provisions ‘should be consistent with [the Brussels I] Regulation’. 61      In that regard, it should be observed that the applicant has not provided any specific and substantiated arguments explaining how the application of the minimum remuneration requirement to employees with their home base in Italy, first, limits the choice of law applicable to their employment contracts under Article 8(1), (2) and (4) of the Rome I Regulation and, second, deprives those employees of the protection afforded by Article 8(1) of the Rome I Regulation. 62      Even if the minimum remuneration requirement applies to employees with their home base in Italy, the applicant does not put forward any argument explaining how such a requirement would preclude the application of the law of a Member State other than Italy to an employment contract if it was justified by the circumstances provided for in Article 8(2) to (4) of the Rome I Regulation. Accordingly, as the Commission maintains, and as the interveners argued at the hearing, the risk of a breach of that article of the Rome I Regulation has not been demonstrated. 63      Similarly, although the applicant claims that there may be particular cases where the Member State in which a crew member habitually carries out his or her work differs from that of his or her home base, contrary to what is found, in essence, in recital 98 of the contested decision, it must be found that it has not adduced substantiated arguments capable of demonstrating that, even if such cases were assumed to exist, the application of the minimum remuneration requirement infringes Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation. 64      In the light of the foregoing, the present plea must be rejected. Third plea, alleging infringement of Article 107(2)(b) TFEU 65      The applicant claims that the Commission infringed Article 107(2)(b) TFEU by committing manifest errors of assessment in its examination of both the causal link between the travel restrictions at issue (see paragraph 8 above) and the damage establishing entitlement to compensation and the proportionality of the amended scheme at issue. 66      In that regard, the applicant raises three complaints, concerning, first, failure to take account of the financial difficulties faced by Blue Panorama; second, failure to take account of other State aid received by Deutsche Lufthansa AG and other entities in its group (‘the Lufthansa Group’), to which Air Dolomiti also belongs; and third, provision of compensation for the damage suffered by the beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue over the whole of 2021 and the calculation of the damage. Failure to take account of Blue Panorama’s financial difficulties 67      The applicant submits that the Commission failed to take into account Blue Panorama’s financial difficulties before the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the applicant, the methodology for calculating the damage described in the contested decision did not make it possible to identify Blue Panorama’s losses that were attributable to those financial difficulties and therefore to exclude them from the damage covered by the amended scheme at issue. The applicant observes that such an error led to the annulment by the General Court, in the judgment of 9 June 2021, Ryanair v Commission (Condor; Covid-19) (T‑665/20, EU:T:2021:344), of a State aid measure in favour of the airline Condor. 68      The Commission, supported by Neos, contests the arguments put forward by the applicant. 69      As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, according to the case-law, only damage caused directly by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences may be compensated under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU (judgment of 23 February 2006, Atzeni and Others, C‑346/03 and C‑529/03, EU:C:2006:130, paragraph 79). 70      In particular, according to the case-law, the occurrence giving rise to the damage, as defined in the contested decision, must be the determining cause of the damage which the aid at issue is intended to remedy and must be directly responsible for causing it. A direct link exists only where the damage is the direct consequence of the occurrence in question without being dependent on the interposition of other causes. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the Commission to examine with particular care whether the occurrence was really the decisive cause of the damage suffered by the beneficiary of the aid concerned or, on the contrary, some of the damage suffered was due to the beneficiary’s pre-existing difficulties (judgment of 18 October 2023, Ryanair v Commission (Alitalia I; COVID-19), T‑225/21, not published, EU:T:2023:644, paragraph 46). 71      That said, there is nothing to prevent the beneficiary of aid under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU from being a firm in difficulty (judgment of 18 October 2023, Ryanair v Commission (Alitalia I; COVID-19), T‑225/21, not published, EU:T:2023:644, paragraph 47). 72      In the present case, in recitals 40 to 48 of the contested decision and in recitals 10 to 17 thereof, the Commission described the methodology for calculating the damage that established an entitlement to compensation under the amended scheme at issue. In summary, it involved comparing, on each of the routes concerned, the actual results of the beneficiaries of the scheme during the periods of application of the travel restrictions at issue and also the results in a scenario excluding those travel restrictions. The total amount of the damage corresponded to the difference between those two results, calculated on the basis of the revenue and the fixed and variable costs of the beneficiaries on each of the routes concerned. 73      In that regard, in the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the Commission should have taken account of Blue Panorama’s financial difficulties before the COVID-19 pandemic, it should be observed that Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 [TFEU] (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9), entitled ‘Definitions’, provides, in point (d), that an ‘aid scheme’ means ‘any act on the basis of which, without further implementing measures being required, individual aid awards may be made to undertakings defined within the act in a general and abstract manner and any act on the basis of which aid which is not linked to a specific project may be awarded to one or several undertakings for an indefinite period of time and/or for an indefinite amount’. The definition of ‘individual aid’ in Article 1(e) of that regulation is ‘aid that is not awarded on the basis of an aid scheme and notifiable awards of aid on the basis of an aid scheme’. 74      It is settled case-law that, in the specific case of an aid scheme, the Commission may merely study the characteristics of the scheme at issue in order to assess, in the grounds for its decision, whether, by reason of the arrangements provided for under the scheme, the latter gives an appreciable advantage to beneficiaries in relation to their competitors and is likely to benefit in particular undertakings engaged in trade between Member States. Accordingly, in a decision which concerns such a scheme, the Commission is not required to carry out an analysis of the aid granted in each particular case under the scheme. It is only at the stage of recovery of the aid that it is necessary to look at the individual situation of each undertaking concerned (see judgments of 4 March 2021, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, C‑362/19 P, EU:C:2021:169, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited, and of 19 May 2021, Ryanair v Commission (Spain; Covid-19), T‑628/20, EU:T:2021:285, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited). 75      Accordingly, in the case of such an aid scheme, a distinction must be drawn between the adoption of such a scheme, on the one hand, and the grant of aid on the basis of that scheme, on the other (see judgment of 4 March 2021, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, C‑362/19 P, EU:C:2021:169, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited). 76      Aid granted individually to undertakings on the basis of an aid scheme cannot have any bearing on the examination which the Commission is required to carry out as regards proof of the existence of an advantage under Article 107(1) TFEU, since that grant is merely the consequence of the automatic application of such an aid scheme (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 March 2021, Commission v Fútbol Club Barcelona, C‑362/19 P, EU:C:2021:169, paragraph 75). 77      It is therefore apparent from that case-law that, since the amended scheme at issue is an aid scheme and not an individual aid measure, the Commission was not required to examine in the contested decision the specific risk that possible financial losses incurred by Blue Panorama could be compensated for by that amended scheme. 78      That finding is not undermined by the applicant’s reference, in its observations on Neos’s statement in intervention and at the hearing, to the judgment of 22 November 2001, Mitteldeutsche Erdöl-Raffinerie v Commission (T‑9/98, EU:T:2001:271). Although it is true that the General Court held in paragraph 116 of that judgment that the Commission was entitled to assess, in addition to the general and abstract examination of an aid scheme, the application of that aid scheme in a particular case, it nevertheless limited itself to pointing out that the Commission merely had the power to carry out such an examination. In paragraph 117 of that judgment, the General Court justified the Commission’s use of that power by the particular nature of the situation of the beneficiary of the aid measure, whose investment project that had been affected by the measure had already been the subject of an earlier examination by the Commission, and by the fact that the Member State concerned had itself asked the Commission to assess that particular case. In the present case, even though the beneficiaries of the scheme at issue, including Blue Panorama, were identified in the initial decision, as the applicant states, the Commission had no particular reason to make use of that power. Indeed, the examination of the general characteristics of the amended scheme at issue did not reveal anything to show that the application of that scheme could lead to overcompensation of the damage suffered by the beneficiaries. 79      In the second place, and in any event, it is apparent from the contested decision that the methodology used to calculate the damage suffered by the beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue, as described in paragraph 72 above, took into consideration only the revenues and operating costs of those beneficiaries that were directly linked to their passenger air transport activities on the routes concerned during the periods of application of the travel restrictions at issue. That methodology in principle excluded any potential costs related to insolvency proceedings borne by a beneficiary, unlike the aid measure examined in the judgment of 9 June 2021, Ryanair v Commission (Condor; Covid-19) (T‑665/20, EU:T:2021:344, paragraphs 51 to 64). 80      It must be stated that the applicant has not identified any specific item of expenditure which, in its view, should have been excluded from the calculation of the damage carried out by the Commission, or treated differently by the latter, because that expenditure was caused by Blue Panorama’s potential pre-existing difficulties. 81      It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not submitted any indication or evidence capable of suggesting, let alone proving, that the methodology used to calculate the damage suffered by the beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue could also have compensated, even if only in part, for the losses caused by any pre-existing difficulties of those latter parties. 82      Consequently, it has not been shown that the Commission had any particular reason to examine the risk alleged by the applicant, contrary to what the latter claims. 83      In the light of the foregoing, the present complaint must be dismissed. Failure to take account of the State aid granted to the Lufthansa Group 84      The applicant submits that the aid granted to Air Dolomiti is likely to be disproportionate, since the Commission failed to take into account the various measures of State aid received by the Lufthansa Group, to which Air Dolomiti belongs. According to the applicant, the Commission was required to rule out the risk of a cumulation of aid. 85      The applicant adds that, to the extent that the Commission may seek to justify its approach by reference to the amended initial decision, which stated that the Italian legislation prohibited any cumulation of aid and included an ex post mechanism to recover any aid intended to compensate for the same losses, the components of that decision did not suffice definitely to rule out a risk of a cumulation of aid as regards Air Dolomiti. 86      Furthermore, the applicant observes that the Commission disregarded the fact that, as at the date of adoption of the contested decision, the recapitalisation aid granted to Deutsche Lufthansa, the parent company of Air Dolomiti, had been annulled by the General Court in the judgment of 10 May 2023, Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst v Commission (Lufthansa; COVID-19) (T‑34/21 and T‑87/21, EU:T:2023:248). However, the Commission cannot consider new aid to be compatible with the internal market as long as previous, unlawful aid has not been repaid. 87      The Commission, supported by the interveners, contests the arguments put forward by the applicant. 88      In the first place, it is apparent from the reasoning set out in paragraphs 73 to 78 above that, when examining the amended scheme at issue, which is an aid scheme and not an individual aid measure, the Commission was not required to examine the risk that any aid granted to a group to which one of the potential beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue belonged could profit that beneficiary. Accordingly, the Commission was not obliged to assess the particular case of the application of the amended scheme at issue to Air Dolomiti and the specific risk of a cumulation of aid for the same eligible costs of that airline. 89      In the second place, and in any event, it should be observed that the applicant has not adduced any specific and substantiated evidence capable of demonstrating a real risk of overcompensation of the damage suffered by Air Dolomiti as a result of the travel restrictions at issue by means of the State aid received by other entities in the Lufthansa Group. In fact, its line of argument in that regard is purely speculative. 90      In the third place, it should be stated that the contested decision refers, in recital 70, to the fact that the Italian authorities had committed to make a report to the Commission, within a year of the date of adoption of the contested decision, on the implementation of the amended scheme at issue, with the amounts received by each beneficiary, which is a safeguard against overcompensation. In addition, there are the other safeguards put in place by the Italian Republic to avoid overcompensation of the damage suffered by the beneficiaries under the scheme at issue, which are described in the initial decision and which also applied to the amended scheme at issue, as the Commission confirmed at the hearing. In recitals 38 and 39 of the initial decision, the Commission stated that the Italian Republic had explained to it that the scheme at issue provided safeguards against the risk of overcompensation and a cumulation of aid. First, any damage already compensated for from other sources would be excluded from the damage eligible for compensation. Second, the draft law for the grant of aid under the scheme at issue prohibited the cumulation of aid and established an ex post mechanism to recover any unduly received aid. Third, the fact that the damage eligible for compensation had not already been compensated for by other sources would be certified by an independent auditor’s evaluation report. 91      Consequently, contrary to what the applicant claims, there was no particular reason for the Commission to examine the risk of a cumulation of aid by Air Dolomiti in its assessment of the proportionality of the amended scheme at issue. 92      Lastly, although the applicant criticises the Commission for disregarding the fact that, as at the date of adoption of the contested decision, the recapitalisation aid granted to Deutsche Lufthansa had been annulled by the General Court in the judgment of 10 May 2023, Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst v Commission (Lufthansa; COVID-19) (T‑34/21 and T‑87/21, EU:T:2023:248), the absence of consideration of that judgment in the contested decision does not constitute an error of law. The principle arising from the judgment of 15 May 1997, TWD v Commission (C‑355/95 P, EU:C:1997:241, paragraphs 25 and 26), to which the applicant refers, and according to which the Commission is entitled not to approve a new aid measure granted to an undertaking until any previous aid found to be unlawful received by the same undertaking has been repaid, is not applicable in the present case. That is the case because when the contested decision was taken, the Commission had not considered the recapitalisation aid granted to Deutsche Lufthansa to be incompatible with the internal market and, not having ordered recovery of that aid, the Commission was not expecting it to be repaid. 93      In the light of the foregoing, the present complaint must be dismissed. Compensation for the damage suffered in 2021 and the methodology used to calculate the damage 94      The applicant complains that the Commission authorised compensation for the damage suffered by the beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue over the whole of 2021 and incorrectly calculated the damage. 95      In the first place, according to the applicant, the direct causal link between the fall in demand for passenger air transport in the second half of 2021 and the COVID-19 pandemic is not established in the light of the gradual decrease in the travel restrictions at issue in 2021, and particularly during the second half of that year. 96      In the second place, as regards the calculation of the damage, the applicant criticises the fact that the methodology is based on a decrease in the number of passengers on the routes concerned as compared with the number of passengers in 2019. In that regard, it submits that, since 2019, factors other than the travel restrictions at issue, such as an increase in remote working and virtual meetings, contributed to the decrease in demand for passenger air transport in 2021, and the methodology used, based on a retention rate, does not take account of those more general factors. 97      The Commission, supported by the interveners, contests the arguments put forward by the applicant. 98      In recitals 22 and 64 of the contested decision, the Commission explained that the damage giving rise to an entitlement to compensation under the amended scheme at issue corresponded to that suffered during the periods of application of the travel restrictions at issue for each route concerned. 99      In recitals 40 to 47 of the contested decision and in recitals 10 to 17 thereof, the Commission described the methodology for calculating the damage eligible for compensation under the amended scheme at issue. That methodology was based on the difference between, first, the financial results achieved by the beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue on the routes concerned during the periods of application of one or more of the travel restrictions at issue and, second, such financial results in a scenario without the travel restrictions at issue. That scenario made it possible to calculate the number of passengers that would have been carried, the revenues that would have been received and the costs that would have been paid by the beneficiaries on the routes concerned in the absence of the travel restrictions at issue, and was based on the results of the beneficiaries on the routes concerned during the corresponding period in 2019. In order to determine, in that scenario, the number of passengers on the routes concerned who would have travelled in the absence of the travel restrictions at issue, the methodology provided for the application of ‘retention rates’ to the 2019 data, which were calculated on the basis of the number of passengers who took domestic flights during periods when those flights were not subject to travel restrictions. 100    In recitals 65 to 69 of the contested decision, the Commission, when examining the proportionality of the amended scheme at issue, found that the methodology described in paragraph 99 above made it possible to calculate precisely the number of passengers who would have travelled on the routes concerned during the periods of application of the travel restrictions at issue in the absence of those restrictions and, consequently, to determine the amount of the damage. 101    In that regard, in the first place, as regards the applicant’s argument alleging a lack of direct causal link between the decrease in demand for passenger air transport in the second half of 2021 and the COVID-19 pandemic, owing to the limited number or absence of the travel restrictions at issue, it should be borne in mind that the amended scheme at issue was intended to compensate only the damage suffered by the beneficiaries as a result of those travel restrictions. It is apparent from the contested decision that the damage eligible for compensation was solely that caused on the routes concerned during the periods of application of the travel restrictions at issue (see paragraphs 98 and 99 above). Any other loss of revenue suffered by the beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue in 2021 was not compensated for by that scheme. That means that if, as the applicant claims, there were no travel restrictions at the end of 2021, no compensation was granted by the scheme at issue for that period. That is, moreover, confirmed by the arguments of Air Dolomiti, which asserts that it did not receive any aid linked to losses in revenue suffered during the second half of 2021. Accordingly, the applicant’s line of argument is not capable of challenging the direct causal link between the damage suffered by the beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue and the COVID-19 pandemic. 102    In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the methodology for calculating the damage does not take any account of factors contributing to the decrease in the number of passengers other than the travel restrictions at issue, it must be stated, as the Commission has done, that the methodology used, as described in paragraph 99 above, was specifically designed to exclude from the damage eligible for compensation those passengers who would not have travelled, even in the absence of the travel restrictions at issue. Indeed, the methodology did not merely calculate the difference between operating income on the routes concerned between 2019 and the periods of application of the travel restrictions at issue in 2021. It provided for the application of a retention rate to that difference in order to determine the number of passengers who had not travelled because of the travel restrictions at issue. The methodology therefore took account of the fact that the number of passengers on the routes concerned would have been lower in 2021 than in 2019, even in the absence of the travel restrictions at issue, and sought to exclude the reduction in the number of passengers that was not attributable to those restrictions from the damage to be compensated for under the amended scheme at issue. 103    It must be stated that the applicant has not put forward any substantiated arguments capable of calling into question the methodology for calculating the damage or the retention rates applied. In those circumstances, its arguments must be rejected. 104    Furthermore, although the applicant also criticises the Commission for relying on the Italian authorities to verify the calculation of the damage, such criticism does not suffice to prove a risk of the absence of a causal link between the damage compensated for under the amended scheme at issue and the travel restrictions at issue. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that it is apparent from the contested decision that the beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue had to submit precise data to demonstrate any damage eligible for compensation (recital 13 of the contested decision) and that the Italian authorities had to apply a very precise methodology for calculating that damage. In addition, the latter authorities had committed to submit to the Commission, within one year of the date of adoption of the contested decision, a report on the implementation of the amended scheme at issue, with the amounts received by each beneficiary (recital 70 of the contested decision). Those factors are such as to exclude the risk of overcompensation of the damage suffered by the beneficiaries of the amended scheme at issue. 105    In the light of the foregoing, it is necessary to reject the present complaint and, consequently, the third plea in its entirety. Fourth plea, alleging infringement of the applicant’s procedural rights 106    The applicant submits that the Commission’s examination was incomplete and insufficient, as shown by the arguments put forward in support of the first three pleas. It argues that that attests to the existence of serious difficulties that should have led the Commission to initiate the formal investigation procedure and allow the applicant to submit its comments. 107    The Commission, supported by the interveners, contests the arguments put forward by the applicant. 108    It should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, when an applicant seeks the annulment of a decision of the Commission not to raise objections in relation to State aid, it essentially contests the fact that that decision was adopted without the Commission initiating the formal investigation procedure, thereby infringing the applicant’s procedural rights. In order to have its action for annulment upheld, the applicant may invoke any plea to show that the assessment of the information and evidence which the Commission had at its disposal during the preliminary examination phase of the measure notified should have raised doubts as to the compatibility of that measure with the internal market. The use of such arguments cannot, however, have the consequence of changing the subject matter of the application or altering the conditions of its admissibility. On the contrary, the existence of doubts concerning that compatibility is precisely the evidence which must be adduced in order to show that the Commission was required to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU and Article 6(1) of Regulation 2015/1589 (see judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 143 and the case-law cited). 109    It is for the party applying for annulment of a Commission decision not to raise any objections to State aid to show that there were doubts concerning the compatibility of the aid with the internal market, meaning that the Commission was required to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU. Such proof must be sought both in the circumstances in which the decision was taken and in its content, on the basis of a body of corroborating evidence (see judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 144 and the case-law cited). 110    In particular, the insufficient or incomplete nature of the examination carried out by the Commission during the preliminary examination procedure is an indication that the Commission was faced with serious difficulties in assessing the compatibility of the notified measure with the internal market, which should have led it to initiate the formal investigation procedure (see judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 145 and the case-law cited). 111    In the present case, it is true, as the applicant claims in essence, that if it were to succeed in demonstrating that the Commission had encountered serious difficulties in assessing the compatibility of the amended scheme at issue with the internal market, the contested decision should be annulled on that ground alone, even though the applicant had not established, moreover, that the Commission’s assessments as to the substance were wrong in law or in fact (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 146 and the case-law cited). 112    In order to demonstrate that the Commission encountered such difficulties in assessing the compatibility of the amended scheme at issue with the internal market, the applicant may indeed refer to the assessments on which the Commission relied and, therefore, put forward arguments relating to the merits of the contested decision, even if the examination of those arguments would not lead to the conclusion that the Commission’s assessments as to the substance were wrong in fact or in law (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 147 and the case-law cited). 113    In the case at hand, the present plea alleges, in essence, that the examination carried out by the Commission during the preliminary examination procedure was incomplete and insufficient and that the Commission would have arrived at a different assessment of the compatibility of the amended scheme at issue with the internal market as a result of a formal investigation procedure. 114    It is apparent from the applicant’s written pleadings before the Court that the applicant, in support of the present plea, has reproduced in condensed form the arguments made in the first three pleas in the action, relating to the merits of the contested decision, and has referred to those arguments. 115    However, since the Court has examined the substance of the first three pleas, including the arguments alleging that the examination carried out by the Commission was incomplete and insufficient, it is not required to make a separate assessment of the merits of those arguments in support of the present plea since the applicant, by those arguments, has not put forward specific elements capable of demonstrating that the Commission had encountered serious difficulties in assessing the compatibility of the amended scheme at issue with the internal market (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 September 2023, Ryanair v Commission, C‑320/21 P, EU:C:2023:712, paragraph 149). 116    In the light of the foregoing, the present plea must be rejected. Fifth plea, alleging breach of the duty to state reasons 117    The applicant claims in the application that the Commission failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons under Article 296 TFEU by not addressing several crucial elements in the contested decision. 118    In the first place, as regards the examination of whether the minimum remuneration requirement was compatible with the principles of the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment, the applicant argues that the Commission did not properly explain in the amended initial decision, to which the contested decision refers, why that requirement was appropriate, necessary and proportionate. Furthermore, it did not address the question of whether the collective agreements giving rise to the minimum remuneration requirement were indeed the most representative or generally applicable within the meaning of Article 3(8) of Directive 96/71. 119    In the second place, as regards the examination of the compatibility of the minimum remuneration requirement with Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation, the applicant considers that the Commission did not duly justify its finding, in recital 109 of the amended initial decision, to which the contested decision refers, that all airlines were in any case bound to meet the protection provided by Italian law with respect to their employees with a home base in Italy, no matter the Member State of origin of those airlines. 120    In the third place, as regards the examination of the causal link between the damage suffered by the airlines and the COVID-19 pandemic and of the proportionality of the amended scheme at issue, the applicant contends that the Commission, first, did not explain why the period at issue concerned the entirety of 2021. Second, it did not explain why the entirety of the damage suffered by Blue Panorama was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Third, it disregarded the General Court’s annulment of the award of recapitalisation aid to Deutsche Lufthansa in the judgment of 10 May 2023, Ryanair and Condor Flugdienst v Commission (Lufthansa; COVID-19) (T‑34/21 et T‑87/21, EU:T:2023:248). In addition, according to the applicant, the Commission should have assessed all the aid measures received by the various entities of the Lufthansa Group, including Air Dolomiti, and all the links between those entities. 121    The Commission, supported by Air Dolomiti, contests the arguments put forward by the applicant. 122    It should be borne in mind that the statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU is an essential procedural requirement (judgment of 18 June 2015, Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 37) and must be appropriate to the measure at issue and disclose in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the competent court to exercise its power of review. Accordingly, the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of concern within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgments of 2 April 1998, Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France, C‑367/95 P, EU:C:1998:154, paragraph 63; of 22 June 2004, Portugal v Commission, C‑42/01, EU:C:2004:379, paragraph 66; and of 15 April 2008, Nuova Agricast, C‑390/06, EU:C:2008:224, paragraph 79). 123    In the present case, as regards the nature of the measure at issue, it should be observed that the contested decision was adopted following the preliminary stage of the procedure for reviewing aid established by Article 108(3) TFEU, the sole purpose of which is to allow the Commission to form a prima facie opinion on the partial or total compatibility of the aid concerned with the internal market, without initiating the formal investigation procedure provided for in paragraph 2 of that article, which, for its part, is intended to enable the Commission to be fully informed of all the facts pertaining to that aid. 124    Such a decision, which is taken within a short period of time, must simply set out the reasons why the Commission takes the view that it is not faced with serious difficulties in assessing the compatibility of the aid at issue with the internal market (judgment of 22 December 2008, Régie Networks, C‑333/07, EU:C:2008:764, paragraph 65). 125    In that regard, in the first place, as regards the statement of reasons for the contested decision concerning the compatibility of the minimum remuneration requirement with the principles of the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment, it should be observed, first, that the Court of Justice ruled in the judgment of 23 January 2025, Neos v Ryanair and Commission (C‑490/23 P, EU:C:2025:32), as regards the failure to state reasons in the initial decision as to the compatibility of the requirement at issue with the freedom to provide services, that the General Court had erred in finding a lack of reasoning in the judgment of 24 May 2023, Ryanair v Commission (Italy; aid scheme; COVID-19) (T‑268/21, EU:T:2023:279). 126    It should be stated, second, that it is apparent from the examination of the first plea that the statement of reasons for the amended initial decision, to which the Commission referred in recital 72 of the contested decision, enabled both the applicant to exercise its right to an effective remedy and the General Court to exercise its power of review. That reasoning therefore satisfies the requirements of the case-law cited in paragraph 122 above. In addition, although the applicant states that the Commission should have explained in more detail why the minimum remuneration requirement was appropriate, necessary and proportionate in the light of the freedom to provide services, it must be held that such an examination was not necessary, in accordance with the reasoning set out in paragraph 43 above. 127    In the second place, as regards the statement of reasons for the contested decision concerning the compatibility of the minimum remuneration requirement with Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation, it must be stated, first of all, that that criticism is in fact directed at the merits of the Commission’s assessment in the amended initial decision, to which recital 72 of the contested decision refers, rather than the level of reasoning for that assessment. In any event, it must be found that it is apparent from the examination of the second plea that the statement of reasons in the amended initial decision enabled both the applicant to exercise its right to an effective remedy and the Court to exercise its power of review. That reasoning therefore satisfies the requirements of the case-law cited in paragraph 122 above. 128    In the third place, as regards the statement of reasons for the contested decision concerning the examination of the causal link between the damage suffered by the airlines and the COVID-19 pandemic and the proportionality of the amended scheme at issue, first, it is apparent from paragraphs 98 to 101 above that the Commission described, in the contested decision, the travel restrictions at issue which were in force in 2021 and explained that only the travel restrictions affecting the routes concerned were relevant for the calculation of the damage covered by the amended scheme at issue. Second, it is also apparent from paragraphs 69 to 82 and 88 to 92 above that the Commission was not required to examine Blue Panorama’s pre-existing financial difficulties or the aid received by the Lufthansa Group, including the recapitalisation aid received by the parent company of the group. 129    In the light of the foregoing, the present plea must be rejected. 130    Consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 131    Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission and the interveners, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the latter. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) hereby: 1.      Dismisses the action; 2.      Orders Ryanair DAC to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission, Neos SpA and Air Dolomiti SpA – Linee Aeree Regionali Europee. Kowalik-Bańczyk Cassagnabère Pavelin Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 8 July 2026. V. Di Bucci M. van der Woude Registrar President *      Language of the case: English.