T-540/25

PostanowienieTSUE2026-06-03CELEX: 62025TO0540ECLI:EU:T:2026:371

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Zagadnienie prawne
Czy Rada Unii Europejskiej i Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych (ESDZ) mogą być pozwanymi w skardze o stwierdzenie nieważności aktów dotyczących zarządzania personelem misji WPBiO, czy też wyłącznie misja EUPOL COPPS jest właściwym pozwanym?
Ratio decidendi
Sąd uznał, że zaskarżone akty, dotyczące zarządzania personelem misji EUPOL COPPS (w tym decyzja o nieprzedłużeniu oddelegowania), zostały przyjęte wyłącznie przez personel lub organy EUPOL COPPS. Misja EUPOL COPPS, na mocy decyzji Rady 2013/354/WPZiB, posiada zdolność prawną do bycia stroną w postępowaniach sądowych i jest odpowiedzialna za roszczenia wynikające z realizacji jej mandatu, w tym w zakresie zarządzania personelem. Ani Rada, ani ESDZ nie były autorami tych aktów, ani nie były zaangażowane w proces ich przyjmowania, ponieważ akty te nie miały charakteru politycznego lub strategicznego (w przypadku Rady), a ESDZ nie posiadała uprawnień w zakresie zarządzania personelem EUPOL COPPS. W konsekwencji, skarga przeciwko Radzie i ESDZ jest niedopuszczalna.
Stan faktyczny
Skarżąca, DV, była oddelegowana przez włoskie Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych do misji EUPOL COPPS jako doradca ds. praw człowieka. W związku z jej wynikami, wszczęto wobec niej plan poprawy wyników, a następnie zalecono nieprzedłużanie jej oddelegowania. Szef misji EUPOL COPPS podjął decyzję o nieprzedłużeniu oddelegowania, a odwołanie skarżącej zostało oddalone. Skarżąca wniosła skargę o stwierdzenie nieważności szeregu aktów dotyczących tej sprawy przeciwko Radzie Unii Europejskiej, Europejskiej Służbie Działań Zewnętrznych (ESDZ) oraz misji EUPOL COPPS.
Rozstrzygnięcie
1. Skarga zostaje oddalona w zakresie, w jakim została wniesiona przeciwko Radzie Unii Europejskiej i Europejskiej Służbie Działań Zewnętrznych (ESDZ). 2. DV pokrywa własne koszty i koszty poniesione przez Radę i ESDZ w związku z postępowaniem dotyczącym podniesionych przez Radę i ESDZ zarzutów niedopuszczalności. 3. W pozostałym zakresie rozstrzygnięcie o kosztach zostaje odroczone.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) 3 June 2026 (*) ( Action for annulment – Common foreign and security policy – National staff member seconded to EUPOL COPPS – Standard Operating Procedure concerning the Performance and Development Process – Decision not to extend the applicant’s secondment – Partial inadmissibility ) In Case T‑540/25, DV, residing in [confidential], (1) represented by S. Pappas and A. Pappas, lawyers, applicant, v Council of the European Union, represented by M. Bauer, J. Rurarz and S. Lejeune, acting as Agents, European External Action Service (EEAS), represented by R. Spáč and E. Orgován, acting as Agents, and European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS), represented by K. Limdal, in her capacity as Head of Mission, and by E. Raoult, lawyer, defendants, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber), composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, President, R. da Silva Passos and T. Pavelin (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: V. Di Bucci, makes the following Order 1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, [confidential], seeks the annulment of several acts concerning her (‘the contested acts’) adopted by members of staff or the offices of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) in the context of the Standard Operating Procedure (‘the SOP’).  Background to the dispute 2        The applicant was seconded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to serve as Human Rights Adviser at EUPOL COPPS from 20 May 2024 to 19 May 2025. 3        On 20 November 2024, the applicant attended a meeting with her direct line manager at the time, namely the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS. During that meeting, the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS informed the applicant that a Performance Improvement Plan, within the meaning of point 5 of the SOP, was to be initiated on the basis of her underperformance. 4        On 21 November 2024, the applicant received an initial Performance Improvement Plan form concerning her. That document reported on the applicant’s conduct since the beginning of her secondment to EUPOL COPPS, and highlighted the aspects of her conduct which she had to improve. 5        After attending two follow-up meetings in connection with that plan, the applicant received, by email, the form of 19 March 2025, as completed by the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS, who terminated the Performance Improvement Plan which concerned her (‘the form of 19 March 2025’). By that form, the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS recommended to the Head of EUPOL COPPS the non-extension of the applicant’s secondment. 6        On 16 April 2025, the applicant submitted her observations on the form of 19 March 2025. 7        On 22 April 2025, the applicant received the non-extension form as completed by the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS and then by the Head of EUPOL COPPS. First, that document reiterated the recommendation of the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS not to extend the applicant’s secondment. Secondly, it contained the decision of 18 April 2025 by which the Head of EUPOL COPPS had followed the recommendation of the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS and had not extended the applicant’s secondment (‘the first non-extension decision’). 8        On 6 May 2025, the applicant brought an appeal under point 7 of the SOP against that decision. 9        On 18 May 2025, the Appeals Board of EUPOL COPPS issued a negative recommendation to the Head of EUPOL COPPS in respect of that appeal (‘the Appeals Board’s recommendation’). 10      On 19 May 2025, the Head of EUPOL COPPS dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first non-extension decision (‘the second non-extension decision’).  Forms of order sought 11      The applicant claims that the Court should: –        annul the second non-extension decision; –        in the event that they produce independent legal effects, annul, first, the form of 19 March 2025, secondly, the first non-extension decision, and, thirdly, the Appeals Board’s recommendation; –        order the Council of the European Union, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EUPOL COPPS to pay the costs. 12      In separate documents lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 9 and 24 October 2025, respectively, and containing pleas of inadmissibility under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the Council and the EEAS contend that the Court should: –        dismiss the action as inadmissible in so far as it is directed against them; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. 13      EUPOL COPPS contends that the Court should: –        dismiss the action as inadmissible; –        alternatively, dismiss the action as manifestly unfounded; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. 14      In its observations on the pleas of inadmissibility lodged at the Court Registry on 22 January 2026, the applicant claims that the Court should: –        declare the action admissible at least in so far as it is directed against the Council, the EEAS or EUPOL COPPS; –        order, so far as concerns the pleas of inadmissibility, each party to bear its own costs.  Law 15      Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may, if the defendant so requests, rule on the question of admissibility without going to the substance of the case. 16      In the present case, since the Council and the EEAS have requested the Court to give a ruling on inadmissibility, the Court considers that it has sufficient information available to it from the material in the file and has decided to give a decision on those requests without taking further steps in the proceedings. 17      In the context of their pleas of inadmissibility, in the first place, the Council and the EEAS contend that they are not the authors of the contested acts. 18      In the second place, both the Council and the EEAS contend that EUPOL COPPS is a legal entity distinct from them. 19      In the third place, the Council and the EEAS contend that the contested acts are not attributable to them, in so far as neither the Council nor the EEAS were involved in any way in the process for adopting those acts. 20      In her observations on the pleas of inadmissibility, the applicant explains that, having had difficulties in identifying with certainty the proper defendant in the present case, she considered it appropriate to direct the present action against the Council, the EEAS and EUPOL COPPS. 21      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, actions for annulment under Article 263 TFEU must be brought against the EU institution, body, office or agency that adopted the act in question (see order of 19 November 2018, Iccrea Banca v Commission and SRB, T‑494/17, EU:T:2018:804, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). 22      In the present case, in the first place, it must be held that the contested acts were all adopted by members of staff or the offices of EUPOL COPPS in the course of exercising that mission’s mandate pursuant to Council Decision 2013/354/CFSP of 3 July 2013 on [EUPOL COPPS] (OJ 2013 L 185, p. 12). 23      First, it must be stated that the form of 19 March 2025, the first non-extension decision, the Appeals Board’s recommendation and the second non-extension decision were adopted (i) by the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS, (ii) by the Head of EUPOL COPPS, (iii) by the Appeals Board of EUPOL COPPS, and (iv) by the Head of EUPOL COPPS. Moreover, in her form of order in the context of the application, the applicant identifies those persons and those offices as being the authors of the contested acts. 24      Secondly, it should be noted that all the contested acts were adopted in the context of the Performance and Development Process which resulted in the applicant’s Performance Improvement Plan, in so far as that process is governed by the SOP. In that sense, and as the applicant recognises, the contested acts relate to the management of the staff of EUPOL COPPS. 25      Among those acts, it should be noted that the first and second non-extension decisions are directly connected with the exercise, by the Head of EUPOL COPPS, of his or her powers pursuant to Decision 2013/354 and, therefore, with the implementation by EUPOL COPPS of its mandate (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 17 July 2024, Montanari v EUCAP Sahel Niger, T‑371/22, EU:T:2024:494, paragraph 75). According to Article 6(1) and (2) of Decision 2013/354, the Head of EUPOL COPPS assumes the responsibility for EUPOL COPPS and is its representative. Furthermore, under Article 6(2) of that decision, under his or her overall responsibility, the Head of EUPOL COPPS may delegate management tasks in staff matters to staff members of EUPOL COPPS, such as the Deputy Head of EUPOL COPPS who produced the form of 19 March 2025. 26      As for the Appeals Board’s recommendation, it was set out pursuant to point 7.3 of the SOP relating to the competence of that Appeals Board. 27      In the second place, EUPOL COPPS must be regarded in the present case as an office of the European Union capable of being a defendant in an action brought on the basis of Article 263 TFEU. In that regard, to determine whether an entity or structure coming under or working within the European Union’s organisational framework may be regarded as an office or agency of the European Union, it is necessary to ascertain whether, in the light of the provisions governing the status of the entity or structure concerned, it has sufficient legal capacity in order to be considered as an independent body of the European Union and be recognised as having legal capacity to be a defendant. In particular, the entity or structure in question must be classified as an office or agency of the European Union when, on the one hand, it has a mandate intrinsically linked to the functioning of the European Union and, on the other hand, it is legally distinct from the existing institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 26 July 2023, Stockdale v Council and Others, T‑776/20, EU:T:2023:422, paragraph 134 and the case-law cited). 28      It is apparent from the legal framework recalled by the Council and the EEAS that EUPOL COPPS is responsible and has the capacity to act as a defendant in any court proceedings relating to the consequences of implementing the mission entrusted to it, including, therefore, in the context of an action brought on the basis of Article 263 TFEU. 29      More specifically, Article 11a of Decision 2013/354 states that EUPOL COPPS is to have the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings, as required in order to implement that decision. In addition, under Article 12(4) of that decision, EUPOL COPPS is to be responsible for any claims and obligations arising from the implementation of the mandate, with the exception of any claims relating to serious misconduct by the Head of Mission, for which he or she is to bear the responsibility. 30      Furthermore, it should be noted that it is apparent from Article 7 of Decision 2013/354, entitled ‘EUPOL COPPS Staff’, and in particular from paragraphs 2 and 4 thereof, that EUPOL COPPS is empowered to recruit and manage its staff independently, without being required to obtain the agreement of other EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies before performing acts of staff management. 31      It follows from the foregoing that EUPOL COPPS may be held responsible and, therefore, that it is capable of being a defendant in any action relating to the consequences of the implementation of the mission entrusted to it (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 24 February 2022, Eulex Kosovo, C‑283/20, EU:C:2022:126, paragraphs 43 to 47). 32      In the third place, it must be held that neither the Council nor the EEAS are the authors of the contested acts and that they were not involved in any way in the Performance and Development Process which resulted in the applicant’s Performance Improvement Plan, and then in the contested acts, with the result that those acts cannot be attributable to them. 33      In that regard, it must be noted that neither the SOP nor any of the contested acts refer to the Council or the EEAS. 34      In view of the links of EUPOL COPPS with the Council and the EEAS, the latter have not been granted the power to influence the process of adoption, by EUPOL COPPS, of purely acts of staff management, such as the contested acts. 35      First, as regards the Council, it is apparent from Article 9(1) of Decision 2013/354 that the Council is responsible, in conjunction with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for the exercise, by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), of the political control and strategic direction of EUPOL COPPS. Moreover, under that provision, the powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of EUPOL COPPS are to remain vested in the Council. 36      However, as the Council contends, it should be noted that the contested acts are not of a political or strategic nature, for the purposes of Article 9(1) of Decision 2013/354. 37      Secondly, as regards the EEAS, it has no power over EUPOL COPPS in respect of the adoption of acts such as those the subject of the present action. 38      The only provisions of Decision 2013/354 relating to the involvement of the EEAS in staff management are Article 7(2) of Decision 2013/354, under which the EEAS may second its staff to EUPOL COPPS, and Article 11(3) of that decision, which provides for the Head of EUPOL COPPS to be assisted by a Senior Mission Security Officer, who is to report to the Head of EUPOL COPPS and also maintain a close functional relationship with the EEAS. 39      It follows from the foregoing considerations that the contested acts were adopted by, and are solely attributable to, EUPOL COPPS. 40      Therefore, the present action should have been brought only against EUPOL COPPS and must be declared inadmissible in so far as it is directed against the Council and the EEAS. 41      In the light of all of the foregoing, the pleas of inadmissibility of the Council and the EEAS must be upheld.  Costs 42      In accordance with Article 133 of the Rules of Procedure, the General Court is to give a decision as to costs in the judgment or order which closes the proceedings. Since the present order closes the proceedings in so far as they are between the applicant and, on the one hand, the Council and, on the other, the EEAS, a decision as to costs must be given in relation to those proceedings. 43      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. However, under Article 135(1) of those rules, if equity so requires, the Court may decide that an unsuccessful party is to pay only a proportion of the costs of the other party in addition to bearing his or her own, or even that he or she is not to be ordered to pay any. 44      In the present case, the applicant argues that it would be inequitable to order her to pay the costs of the Council and the EEAS, since the decision to direct the action against several defendants was a reasonable procedural choice, in a context where it was not possible to identify the proper defendant with certainty (see paragraph 20 above). 45      In the light of the foregoing arguments, it should, however, be noted that the applicant could have identified the author of each of the contested acts. 46      Consequently, the applicant must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the Council and the EEAS. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) hereby orders: 1.      The action is dismissed in so far as it is directed against the Council of the European Union and the European External Action Service (EEAS). 2.      DV shall bear her own costs and pay those incurred by the Council and the EEAS in the context of the proceedings relating to the pleas of inadmissibility put forward by the Council and the EEAS. 3.      The costs are reserved as to the remainder. Luxembourg, 3 June 2026. V. Di Bucci   K. Kowalik-Bańczyk Registrar   President *      Language of case: English. Confidential information redacted.

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