T-85/26

ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT 17 April 2026 (*) ( Interim relief – Research and technological development – Framework Programme for Research and Innovation ‘Horizon 2020’ (2014-2020) – Grant agreements – Final audit report – Application for interim measures – No urgency ) In Case T‑85/26 R, European Institute for Innovation through Health Data, established in Oosterzele (Belgium), represented by P. Lefebvre and T. O’Kelly, lawyers, applicant, v Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, represented by U. Blomberg, acting as Agent, defendant, THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT makes the following Order 1        By its action under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, the European Institute for Innovation through Health Data, requests suspension of the execution and ‘enforcement’ of the final audit report of 12 September 2025 relating to the projects financed by the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking (‘the IHI Joint Undertaking’), namely Projects ‘821520 – ConcePTION’, ‘853966 – EU-PEARL’, and ‘945345 – H2O’, carried out in connection with, respectively, Grant Agreement Number 821520 – ConcePTION of 6 May 2019, Grant Agreement Number 853966 – EU-PEARL of 27 November 2019, and Grant Agreement Number 945345 – H2O of 30 September 2020 (‘the grant agreements at issue’).  Background to the dispute and forms of order sought 2        The applicant is an international non-profit organisation, founded in Belgium on 28 April 2015. 3        The IHI Joint Undertaking was established by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014 (OJ 2021 L 427, p. 17). 4        According to Article 3(1) of Regulation 2021/2085, the joint undertakings are set up as bodies of the Union. 5        The applicant was involved, as a beneficiary, with the grant agreements at issue, under the framework programme for research and innovation ‘Horizon 2020’. 6        The grant agreements at issue were the subject of an ex post audit managed by the audit service of the European Commission and concerning, inter alia, the eligibility of the personnel costs declared in those agreements. 7        On 12 September 2025, the final audit report found, regarding the ‘personnel costs: ineligible costs declared under personnel costs category’, that the contracts with in-house consultants had not been concluded with natural persons, but with legal entities owned by those natural persons, that is to say, with one-person companies. Each of the consultants had issued invoices via the legal entity owned by that consultant, whereas, according to the annotations to Article 6.2.A.2 of each of the grant agreements at issue, there had to be a direct contract between the natural person concerned and the beneficiary. The contract could not be concluded with a third party legal entity, even if that third party were a one-person company. 8        The Commission’s audit service and the IHI Joint Undertaking agreed with the findings of that audit. 9        On 15 October 2025, by a pre-information letter bearing the reference Ares(2025)8775270, the IHI Joint Undertaking, in connection with the recovery procedure for Project Number 853966 – EU-PEARL, informed the applicant of its intention to recover the sum of EUR 330 835.91. 10      By email of 17 December 2025, the IHI Joint Undertaking, inter alia, confirmed that the implementation of the results of the audit could not be suspended. Concerning communication with the other members of the consortium, the IHI Joint Undertaking indicated that the services responsible had been directed to proceed with caution, in accordance with the applicable guidelines and procedures. 11      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 6 February 2026, the applicant has brought an action under Article 272 TFEU, in which it claims, inter alia, that the Court should: –        declare that the grant agreements at issue must be interpreted and applied in such a way that the personnel costs concerned constitute eligible costs under those agreements; –        in the alternative, declare that, through the refusal to accept the personnel costs concerned, the applicant is being subjected to unequal treatment; –        in the further alternative, declare that the refusal to accept the personnel costs concerned constitutes an abuse of rights; –        declare that the other errors found in the final audit report are not of a systemic or recurrent nature and cannot therefore be extrapolated to other projects; –        order the IHI Joint Undertaking to pay the costs. 12      By separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 9 February 2026, the applicant has made the present application for interim relief, in which it claims that the President of the General Court should: –        on an interim basis, order the suspension of the execution and ‘enforcement’ of the final audit report pending the outcome of the proceedings brought before the General Court in the main action; –        order the IHI Joint Undertaking to pay the costs of the present proceedings. 13      In its observations regarding the application for interim relief, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 24 February 2026, the IHI Joint Undertaking contends that the President of the General Court should: –        refuse the application for interim relief; –        reserve the costs.  Law  General considerations 14      It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU together with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim relief may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of an act challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, pursuant to Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the Union are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim relief may order that the operation of an act challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any interim measures (order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12). 15      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim relief must state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’. 16      The judge hearing an application for interim relief may thus order the suspension of the operation of an act, as well as other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the interests of the party seeking interim relief, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be refused if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim relief is also to weigh up, when necessary, the interests involved (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 17      In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application for interim relief enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre‑established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 18      Having regard to the material in the case file, the President of the General Court considers that he has all the information needed to rule on the present application for interim relief and that there is no need to hear oral argument from the parties beforehand. 19      In order to assess whether the cumulative conditions necessary for the grant of interim measures are satisfied in the present case, and without it being necessary to give a ruling on the admissibility of the applicant’s heads of claim, it is necessary to begin by examining whether the condition relating to urgency is satisfied.  The condition relating to urgency 20      In order to determine whether the requested interim measures are urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the EU judicature. To attain that objective, urgency must, generally, be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the party seeking interim relief. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the proceedings relating to the main action without suffering serious and irreparable harm (see order of 14 January 2016, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, C‑517/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). 21      Furthermore, under the second sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure, applications for interim relief ‘shall contain all the evidence and offers of evidence available to justify the grant of interim measures’. 22      It is in the light of those criteria that it is necessary to examine whether the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating urgency. 23      In the present case, in the first place, the applicant submits that the refusal to pay it for the work already carried out by its consultants and the act of requiring it to reimburse the sums already paid to it puts it under enormous financial pressure. In that regard, it explains that it is at serious risk of being in a very difficult financial situation as a direct result of the IHI Joint Undertaking’s conduct. 24      In the second place, the applicant argues that several of its partners have noticed that various costs have been rejected, meaning that those various partners are also suffering financial consequences due to the IHI Joint Undertaking’s decision and that this is severely affecting the applicant’s reputation among those partners, which is blatantly in breach of Article 36 of the grant agreements at issue, which lays down a general obligation to maintain confidentiality. 25      In that context, in particular, the applicant alleges that, on 8 January 2026, one of its partners asked the applicant to reimburse it the sum of EUR 214 281.80, which the IHI Joint Undertaking had refused to pay to the applicant. On 9 February 2026, that partner threatened to take further steps if the applicant were to fail to reimburse those costs within a seven-day period. According to the applicant, this demonstrates the rapidly escalating costs and the damage to its reputation arising from the IHI Joint Undertaking’s refusal to ‘suspend the enforcement of measures’. 26      The applicant concludes that it is of the utmost importance that the enforcement of ‘any measures by [the IHI Joint Undertaking]’ be suspended pending the outcome of the proceedings relating to the main action before the General Court, in order to avoid any irreversible financial damage (both to the applicant and to its partners), as well as any irreversible damage to the applicant’s reputation. 27      In that regard, in the first place, as regards the financial damage alleged by the applicant, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, in the event of harm of a financial nature, an interim measure is justified where, in the absence of that measure, the party seeking interim relief would be in a position that would imperil its financial viability before final judgment is given in the main action, or where its market share would be affected substantially in the light, inter alia, of the size and turnover of its undertaking as well as, where appropriate, the characteristics of the group to which it belongs (see order of 12 March 2021, Ciano Trading & Services CT & S and Others v Commission, T‑45/21 R, not published, EU:T:2021:131, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited). 28      In addition, it follows from firmly established case-law that harm of a financial nature is considered to be irreparable if it cannot be quantified, that is to say, where it is already clear, when the assessment is carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim relief, that, in view of its nature and the manner in which it will foreseeably occur, the harm alleged, should it occur, may not be adequately identified or quantified and that, in practice, it will not therefore be possible to make good such harm by bringing an action for damages under Articles 268 and 340 TFEU (see order of 13 February 2014, Luxembourg Pamol (Cyprus) and Luxembourg Industries v Commission, T‑578/13 R, not published, EU:T:2014:103, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited). 29      To that end, the judge hearing the application for interim relief must have specific and precise information, supported by detailed, certified documentary evidence, which shows the situation in which the party requesting the interim measures finds itself and enables the probable consequences, should the requested measures not be granted, to be assessed. It follows that that party, in particular when it relies on the occurrence of financial damage, must, in principle, produce, with supporting documentation, an accurate overall picture of its financial situation (see order of 10 July 2018, Synergy Hellas v Commission, T‑244/18 R, not published, EU:T:2018:422, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). 30      In the present case, it must be found that the applicant has not adduced any evidence to show that, should the requested interim measures not be granted, it would be in a position that would imperil its financial viability, such as, for example, the cessation of its operations before the handing down of the decision in the main action. 31      Indeed, mere allegations of (i) a serious risk entailing serious financial difficulties and (ii) irreversible financial damage cannot compensate for the lack of specific information, supported by documentation, relating to the applicant’s financial situation. 32      In those circumstances, it must be held that the applicant has not succeeded in demonstrating that there is urgency due to a risk to its financial viability. 33      In the second place, regarding the applicant’s argument that its various partners are also experiencing financial consequences, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, an applicant may not, in order to establish urgency, rely on damage caused to the rights of third parties or to the general interest (see order of 26 September 2017, António Conde & Companhia v Commission, T‑443/17 R, not published, EU:T:2017:671, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). 34      In the present case, it must be pointed out that the applicant is relying, in that regard, on damage which does not concern it personally. As a result, it cannot rely, in order to demonstrate urgency, on damage which would be suffered by third party legal entities. 35      In the third place, regarding the argument relating to the threat to the applicant’s reputation among its partners, it should be emphasised that the applicant has not produced any precise, objective evidence capable of demonstrating that its professional reputation, its eligibility for future funding, or its participation in ongoing projects would be seriously and irreversibly affected before a decision is taken on the substance. 36      As the IHI Joint Undertaking contends in its observations regarding the application for interim relief, the alleged damage arising from the threat to reputation is closely linked to the financial effects of the execution and enforcement of the final audit report of 12 September 2025 and remains of a hypothetical nature, in so far as there is no evidence enabling it to be established that that damage would be imminent or that it could not be remedied at a later stage. 37      Having regard to the foregoing, it must be concluded that the applicant has not succeeded in demonstrating that there is a risk that serious and irreparable harm will occur. 38      Given that the applicant has failed to establish that the condition relating to urgency has been satisfied, the application for interim relief must be refused, without it being necessary to give a ruling on whether there is a prima facie case or to weigh up the interests involved. 39      Under Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs must be reserved. On those grounds, THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT hereby orders: 1.      The application for interim relief is refused. 2.      The costs are reserved. Luxembourg, 17 April 2026. V. Di Bucci   M. van der Woude Registrar   President *      Language of the case: English.